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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to outline trends and patterns in movements of asylum-
seekers to Western so-called industrialized countries from 1990-2001. The paper begins
by characterizing three distinct phases of asylum migration since the end of the Second
World War. It then provides background material on global refugee and asylum
movements, using statistics from UNHCR. The data for selected receiving countries and
regions is discussed, followed by some remarks on changing routes used by asylum-
seekers. The selected countries and regions are Australia, Canada, the EU and the USA.
Finally, we examine some of the causal factors behind asylum migration and attempt to
identify their significance upon flows migration.
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1 Introduction
This paper outlines trends and patterns in movements of asylum-seekers to Western,
industrialized countries from 1990-2001. The receiving countries covered are the USA,
Canada, Australia and Western Europe (which here comprises of the Member States of
the European Union, Norway and Switzerland). Japan and New Zealand have not been
included since the numbers of asylum-seekers involved are relatively small. All sending
countries are included in the data, but our discussion will focus mainly on the countries
of origin of the largest numbers – generally the ‘top ten’ sending countries for each
receiving area. The aims of the desk study reported here are largely descriptive, and its
main substance is contained in the tables and charts (the latter are in the Appendix).
However, the paper also has analytical aspects, as it is not possible to describe the
evolution of the movements without examining the causes of migratory patterns and the
factors responsible for change.
In this paper ‘asylum migration’ is used as shorthand for ‘migratory movements
undertaken for the purpose of, or with the consequence of, seeking asylum in another
state’. This follows Jeff Crisp’s definition for the purposes of the UNU/WIDER
Conference. It is a pragmatic usage, based on the recognition that it is often impossible
to tell at the time of movement whether an asylum-seeker is actually a refugee in the
sense of the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention. Determining this frequently
requires a lengthy and complex process. Moreover, many asylum-seekers will be
permitted to stay on humanitarian or other grounds, even if denied refugee status.
In recent years, some politicians and other observers have claimed that many asylum-
seekers are really economic migrants who are abusing the asylum process. This has led
to increasingly restrictive entry rules. The feedback effect of such policies is that many
genuine refugees are unable to make claims, because they cannot enter a potential
country of asylum. This in turn has caused some asylum-seekers to enter illegally, often
using the services of people smugglers. The result is that the distinction between
asylum-seekers and undocumented migrants has become blurred, leading to the notion
of the ‘asylum-migration nexus’. Ideally, therefore, this study should present data both
on asylum-seeker movements and undocumented migration, and then seek to
disentangle the two. However, the availability and quality of data on undocumented
migration make it extremely difficult to find the empirical information needed for this
type of analysis. The data presented are thus mainly concerned with asylum-seekers.
The paper starts by discussing the development of asylum migration, and then provides
background material on global refugee and asylum movements. The data for the various
Western asylum countries are discussed, followed by some remarks on changing routes
used by asylum-seekers. Finally, we examine some of the causal factors behind asylum
migration.
2 The three phases of asylum migration
All Western European countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the USA are
signatories to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol.
This obliges them to provide protection to persons who qualify under the Convention
definition, according to which a refugee is a person residing outside his or her country2
of nationality, who is unable or unwilling to return because of a ‘well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion’. States party to the Convention undertake not to return
refugees to their country of origin against their will (the principle of non-refoulement).
This may require states to grant entry and/or to provide temporary or permanent
residence status.
The international refugee regime is based on the principle of different treatment for
refugees compared with economic migrants. This worked very well for the classical
refugees of the Cold War: the dissidents who voted with their feet against the repressive
regimes of the Soviet Union and its satellites. They were welcomed with open arms in
the West, as a living proof of the superiority of democracy. Since relatively few got out
through the Iron Curtain, the costs of hospitality were limited. The situation became
more problematic with the struggles against colonialism and authoritarian regimes from
the 1960s onwards. It became extremely difficult to make clear distinctions between
asylum-seekers and economic migrants from countries undergoing rapid change and
crisis. Political upheavals, economic difficulties and violent conflicts tend to occur
simultaneously, so that many migrants have multiple motivations for moving.
Governments too may have multiple motivations for admitting migrants.
The migration-asylum nexus is not a new dilemma. Although some people entering
Western countries are clearly refugees while others are clearly economic migrants, there
have always been people who could not be easily categorized. Often migrants respond
to migration rules and policies of receiving states in deciding on their mode of
migration. From the migrants’ perception such rules and policies can be seen as
opportunity structures, rather than absolute definitions. It is possible to identify three
distinct phases in the development of the migration-asylum nexus.
Phase one: treating refugees as migrant workers. At the end of the Second World War
there were over 40 million displaced persons in Europe. The preferred solution was
repatriation to their home countries, but many had both political and economic reasons
for not wanting to return to countries taken over by Stalinist regimes. Countries like
Australia and Canada offered refuge because they needed labour for economic growth
and people for demographic growth. Similarly, many of the migrant workers who came
to France and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s were escaping authoritarian regimes in
Spain, Portugal, Greece and Turkey. However, they were admitted because the
receiving countries needed labour, and no-one bothered to examine their need for
protection. They were treated as migrant workers and if they lacked passports and visas,
regularization programmes were set up (notably in France) to give them a secure status.
Phase two: migrants with mixed motivations claiming asylum. This followed the 1973
Oil Crisis, when Western European countries stopped labour recruitment and redefined
themselves as ‘zero immigration countries’. For many people, claiming asylum became
the only legal route to entering and settling in the industrialized world. For instance,
when Germany stopped entry of Turkish workers in 1973, the migratory process
continued through family reunion and asylum. This does not imply that the asylum-
seekers were not genuine: Turkey was beset by political instability, military coups and
ethnic conflict. The point is that people who had previously been admitted as workers
now had to claim asylum.3
Phase three: asylum-seekers moving as undocumented migrants. While the right under
international law to claim asylum continued to be generally respected by Western states,
they also began to restrict entry to eliminate bogus claims. By the early 1990s, many
industrialized states, including Western European countries, Australia and the USA
(although not Canada) had introduced policies aimed at restricting access to asylum
including: temporary protection regimes, non-arrival policies (such as imposing visa
requirements on travellers and ‘carrier sanctions’ on airlines), diversion policies (such
as declaring some transit countries as ‘safe third countries’), and deterrence policies
(such as detention and prohibition of employment). Increasingly during the 1990s, and
as an apparent response to tougher rules and regulations, those seeking asylum fled to
industrialized countries through ever more sophisticated ‘illegal’ means, often with the
assistance of people smugglers.
3 Global refugee and asylum-seeker movements
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
global refugee population grew from 2.4 million in 1975 to 10.5 million in 1985 and
14.9 million in 1990. A peak was reached after the end of the Cold War with 18.2
million in 1993. By 2000, the global refugee population had declined to 12.1 million
(UNHCR 1995; UNHCR 2000a).1 Refugees came mainly from countries affected by
war, violence and chaos. Globally, the ten main places of origin of refugees in 1999
were Afghanistan (2.6 million), Iraq (572,000), Burundi (524,000), Sierra Leone
(487,000), Sudan (468,000), Somalia (452,000), Bosnia (383,000), Angola (351,000),
Eritrea (346,000) and Croatia (340,000) (UNHCR 2000b: 315).
Annual asylum applications in Western Europe, Australia, Canada and the USA
combined rose from 90,400 in 1983 to 323,050 in 1988, and then surged again with the
end of the Cold War to peak at 828,645 in 1992 (UNHCR 1995: 253). Altogether,
5 million asylum-seekers entered Western countries from 1985-1995 (UNHCR 1997:
184). Applications fell sharply to 480,00 in 1995, but began creeping up again to
534,500 in 2000 (OECD 2001: 280).2 Nearly the whole of the decline can be explained
by falls in asylum applications following changes in refugee law in Germany (438,200
applications in 1992, but only 127,900 in 1995) and Sweden (84,000 in 1992, 9,000 in
1995). The UK had relatively few asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, with 32,300
in 1992, but numbers increased at the end of the decade to 55,000 in 1998 and 97,900 in
2000 (OECD 2001: 280).
This rise in asylum applications led to considerable concern in Western countries. It
became a major policy issue within the European Union. Western leaders called for
greater burden sharing between countries of asylum. In fact, however, only a small
proportion of asylum-seekers and refugees actually come to the highly developed
countries. Table 1 shows the top ten refugee hosting countries in 2000 according to
                                                
1 The broader category of ‘people of concern to the UNHCR’ (which includes refugees, some internally
displaced persons and some returnees) peaked at 27.4 million in 1995, and was down to 21.1 million
in 2000.
2 Figures for selected OECD countries, including European Economic Area, USA, Canada, Australia
and New Zealand.4
three different criteria. The first column shows the total refugee population. Pakistan
and Iran had by far the largest refugee populations – mainly from Afghanistan. Africa
figures prominently in the table, but the USA is also in the list, together with two
European countries: Germany and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FR Yugoslavia).
However, to understand the weight of the ‘refugee burden’, it is more useful to relate
refugee population to overall population in host countries. This is shown in the second
column of Table 1, which consists mainly of very poor countries, with the sole
exceptions of FR Yugoslavia and Sweden. Even more instructive is to relate refugee
populations to the wealth of the receiving country (third column). This list does not
include a single highly-developed country. Refugees are overwhelmingly concentrated
in the poorest countries.
Table 1
The top ten refugee hosting countries, 2000
Total refugee population Refugees per 1,000
inhabitants








































































Source: UNHCR (2001: 28).
4 Asylum migration to industrialized countries
This section describes asylum migration flows to the various industrialized countries.
Charts 1-4 (see Appendix) show flows to the USA, Canada, Australia and Western
Europe from the ‘top five’ countries of origin of asylum-seekers for the 12-year period.
Annual figures often show fluctuations, with increases in numbers from certain
countries, which are not sustained. Chart 5 compares flows to the various receiving
areas. The tables (in the text below) show the ‘top ten’ countries of origin for the four
selected countries or regions for the years 1990 and 2001. This enables us to compare
the most significant countries of origin at the beginning of the period with those at the
end. It also allows us to see certain regional differences and similarities.
We start with the so-called ‘classical immigration countries’ and then move on to
Western Europe. The USA, Canada and Australia have long histories of immigration,
welcoming both refugees and economic migrants. Today, these three are amongst only5
about ten countries in the world, which have regular programmes for resettlement of
refugees in collaboration with the UNHCR. However, these countries have also
experienced growing inflows of asylum-seekers since the 1980s. By contrast, most
Western European countries have not had resettlement programmes, with the exception
of short-term ones for particular emergencies like Indo-China or Kosovo.
4.1 United States of America
Between 1975 and 2000 the USA provided permanent resettlement to over 2 million
refugees, including some 1.3 million people from Indochina. The USA accepted more
people for resettlement during this period than the rest of the world put together
(UNHCR 2000b). The total number of asylum applications rose from 75,600 in 1990 to
a peak of 148,700 in 1995, then declined to 32,700 in 1999 before rising again to 59,400
in 2001. In 2001, the USA hosted 396,000 pending asylum applicants, 28,0000 persons
granted asylum during the year and 68,500 newly resettled refugees (USCR 2001: 275).
Appendix Chart 1 shows asylum-seeker flows from the top five countries of origin to
the USA. Large numbers of persons fleeing conflict and persecution in Central
American countries began arriving in the USA in the 1980s. Many of these did so
‘illegally’ as the USA did not recognize all Central American countries as refugee
producing countries. The open door policy towards Cubans fleeing to the USA, in place
since 1959, began to be restricted in the 1980s, and interdiction at sea commenced in the
1990s. Large numbers of Haitians attempting to come to the USA during the 1980s and
1990s were generally prevented in doing so.
In the early 1990s, with a weak economy and growing numbers of undocumented
migrants, there were strong anti-immigrant sentiments in the USA. As in other
industrialized states, the numbers of people seeking asylum in the USA rose sharply
during this period, from 20,000 in 1985 to 148,000 in 1995. These sentiments were
reflected in the passing of Proposition 187 in California, a popular referendum which
sought to make undocumented workers ineligible for most social services. Although this
legislation did not apply to asylum-seekers, it sparked a national debate leading to
legislation which did directly affect asylum-seekers. In 1996, Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), as well as
another law severely restricting welfare payments to immigrants. The IIRIRA
fundamentally changed the way in which the US government processed asylum claims
and the rights afforded to asylum-seekers. It created a new legal standard for screening
asylum-seekers arriving at US borders, which aimed to determine whether they should
be admitted to the asylum procedure. It also authorized ‘expedited removals’ and the
detention of asylum-seekers.
As Table 2 shows, at the beginning of the 1990s the top three countries of origin of
asylum-seekers coming to the USA were all Central American states experiencing civil
war: El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. In 1990, asylum-seekers coming from El
Salvador were falling in numbers and continued to do so until 1992 when they began to
rise again, peaking in the mid-1990s at the highest number coming from a single
country during the decade. Their numbers dropped equally dramatically in 1996 and
remained at relatively low levels for the remainder of the decade.6
Table 2




seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers
El Salvador 22,271 Mexico 8,747 El Salvador 223,887
Nicaragua 18,304 China 8,008 Guatemala 178,047
Guatemala 12,234 Colombia 7,144 Mexico 66,338
Cuba 3,925 Haiti 4,938 China 60,926
Romania 1,593 Armenia 2,147 Haiti 51,308
Liberia 1,572 India 1,894 Nicaragua 34,411
Iran 1,550 Indonesia 1,671 India 30,985
Ethiopia 1,532 Ethiopia 1,467 Russia 20,913
China 1,287 Albania 1,425 Pakistan 16,700
Honduras 1,097 Liberia 1,281 Cuba 16,600
Total top 10 65,365 Total top 10 38,722 Total top 10 700,115
Total asylum-
seekers 73,637 Total asylum-
seekers 59,432 Total asylum-
seekers 997,696
Top 10 as share
of total 89% Top 10 as share
of total 65% Top 10 as share
of total 70%
Source: UNHCR, Population Data Unit, PGDS/DOS, Geneva.
Asylum-seekers from Guatemala peaked in the early 1980s during the civil war, but
were again increasing in the early 1990s. However, the number of Guatemalans seeking
asylum in the USA began to fall significantly in 1992 and particularly from 1994
onwards. Although significant numbers continued to arrive for the remainder of the
decade, they were at much abated levels. This drop may reflect the ceasefire and
significant moves towards accountable government in Guatemala in 1992, followed by a
lengthy peace process which advanced significantly in 1994 and culminated in a final
agreement in 1996.
Flows of asylum-seekers to the USA from Nicaragua were dropping in 1990 and did not
rise again significantly during the remainder of the decade. Nicaraguans had been
fleeing to the USA in significant numbers throughout the 1980s. Then in 1988, in the
wake of the Iran-contra affair, the US Congress banned all aid to the Contras. Later that
year, the Sandinista government and the opposition began a national dialogue which
culminated in a series of agreements the following year and ultimately to a cessation to
the conflict.
For the 1990-2001 period as a whole, six out of the top ten sources of asylum-seekers
were Latin American or Caribbean countries, which are relatively close to the US.
However, there were substantial fluctuations over the period. As Table 2 shows, in
1990, the great majority of asylum-seekers came from Latin America. In 2001 by
contrast, the top country of origin was Mexico, followed by China, while the rest of the
top ten included a wide range of areas of origin. Moreover the top ten in 2001 made up
only 65 per cent of all applications, compared with 89 per cent in 1990, indicating a
greater level of diversity in origins. The asylum approval rate for Mexicans was only7
7 per cent, compared with 64 per cent for Chinese and 57 per cent for asylum-seekers
overall (USCR 2001: 275). Asylum-seekers from Colombia were not coming to the
USA in large numbers in 1990 but were by 2001. This appears to reflect the
intensification of the armed conflict there. Although this conflict has been going on for
close to four decades, with large-scale displacement of the civilian population, the
situation has become significantly worse in recent years. The widening of the conflict
across the country has meant that the displaced population is increasingly unsafe
remaining within the borders of their country.
Entry routes have also changed. Most Central Americans come to the USA by land via
Mexico, whereas Cubans and Haitians frequently come by boat. However, numbers
have declined due to interdiction programmes of the US Coast Guard. Quite large
numbers of Chinese were brought in illegally by ship in the mid-1990s, but the number
interdicted in 2001 was only 53, compared with 1,092 in 1999. This indicates a shift to
other means of entry, especially by air using tourist visas.
After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the USA halted its refugee resettlement
programme. Resumption was authorized in November, but the USA only admitted 800
refugees in the last three months of 2001. An Act of October 2001 introduced much
stronger detention powers for non-citizens suspected of terrorist activities. Although
these measures were not directed specifically against asylum-seekers, it was feared that
they might lead to an increase in the already substantial use of detention: an average of
3,000 asylum-seekers were in detention during 2001 (USCR 2001: 279).
Operation Gatekeeper and similar operations were introduced in 1994, in an attempt to
tighten security along the US-Mexico border and reduce the numbers of people entering
the USA illegally. The US Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has introduced
double steel fences, helicopters, high-intensity searchlights and high tech equipment.
The number of agents enforcing the border has tripled over the same period. To fund all
of this, the INS has seen its budget triple since 1994, to US$5.5 billion. However, there
has been no decline in the number of illegal border crossings – indeed official figures
suggest an increase. The number of people dying as they attempt to cross the border has
also increased as people take ever-greater risks: in 1994, 23 people died trying to cross
and this figure has increased every year since then. In 2000, at least 499 died attempting
to cross. The cause of death has also altered as people move ever further eastward in
attempting to cross the border, they usually now die from dehydration, hypothermia,
sunstroke or drowning as they attempt to swim the All American Canal. Finally, the
average cost of hiring a ‘coyote’ – who smuggle people across the border – has risen
from US$143 to US$1,500 in six years (Cornelius 2001).
The Chinese immigrants on the east coast of the USA, particularly in New York, are
largely from Fujian province on the southeast coast of China. Snakeheads (smugglers)
play an important role in facilitating their migration out of China. Smugglers of Chinese
migrants are particularly sophisticated and have access to advanced communications
technology and the ability to make false passports and visas. Most Chinese travel to the
USA by air, whether directly or through transit countries and possibly with some
passage by land. According to a study by Chin (1999) on Fujianese Chinese, 47 per cent
entered the USA by air, 41 per cent entered the USA by land, and only about 12 per cent
by sea. A more recent strategy of transporting undocumented Chinese to the USA, as
well as to Canada and European countries, has been to smuggle them on aeroplanes and
in cargo ships and trucks. According to one study, more than 43 countries have played a8
transit role in airborne and seaborne smuggling of Chinese (Myers 1997: 117). Given
the variety of transit routes, no attempt has been made to map the individual pathways
used. However, it has been reported that Thailand and Mexico are particularly important
transit countries (Kyle and Liang 2001).
As well as tougher border control measures in the USA, new legislation was also
introduced in China in 1999, which allows the government to put illegal migrants in
prison for one year plus impose a heavy fine. Prior to that, China’s policy was to mainly
punish only the smugglers. Despite efforts by law enforcement officials in both
countries, the flow of undocumented workers from China to the USA does not seem to
have abated. The smuggling fee, however, is reported to have risen from US$28,000 in
the early 1990s to US$60,000 in 2001 (Kyle and Liang 2001). One of the most
frequently used justifications for the basis of asylum claims of Chinese in the USA is
China’s ‘One Child Policy’. The practice of the outlawed Falun Gong has also been
used as a basis for claims of asylum more recently.
4.2 Canada
Like the US, Canada accepted large numbers of people from Indochina: some 200,000
between 1975 and 1995. During the 1980s, Canada offered resettlement to an average of
21,000 refugees per year. Between 1989 and 1998, resettlement admissions fell from
35,000 to under 9,000. However, they rose to 17,000 in 1999 as a result of the
humanitarian evacuation programme for refugees from Kosovo (UNHCR 2000b). The
resettlement figure for 2001 was 10,900 (USCR 2001: 263).
As Table 3 shows, the number of asylum-seekers coming to Canada declined from
36,700 in 1990 to 20,300 in 1993, increased again to 39,400 in 1999, and then reached
its highest annual level ever of 44,000 in 2001.
In contrast to the USA, only one out of the top ten countries of origin for the 1990-2001
period was a Latin American country: Mexico. Most asylum-seekers in Canada are from
the Indian sub-continent or China, with Sri Lanka consistently near the top of the list.
The general picture is one of considerable and increasing diversity over the whole
period. Again, a change over time can be seen. The large numbers of asylum-seekers
from Hungary (which Canada did not recognize as a refugee-producing country) and
Zimbabwe in 2001 were new developments in response to unusual circumstances,
leading Canada to impose visa restrictions for both countries. This trend has since
reversed and it seems to have been exceptional to Canada. See Appendix Chart 2 for
asylum migration flows from the top 5 countries of origin.
In 2001, Canada made decisions upon 22,887 refugee claims, with an approval rate of
58 per cent. The highest approval rates were for Afghanistan (97 per cent), Somalia (92
per cent), Colombia (85 per cent), Sri Lanka (76 per cent), and Democratic Republic of
Congo (DR Congo) (76 per cent). The lowest success rates were for Hungary (27 per
cent) and Mexico (28 per cent) (USCR 2001: 261).9
Table 3




seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers
Sri Lanka 4,548 Hungary 3,895 Sri Lanka 40,009
Somalia 3,856 Pakistan 3,192 Somalia 21,120
China 3,086 Sri Lanka 3,001 Pakistan 18,680
Bulgaria 2,514 Zimbabwe 2,653 China 17,651
Lebanon 2,316 China 2,413 Iran 15,590
El Salvador 2,137 Colombia 1,831 India 14,106
Iran 2,101 Turkey 1,755 Mexico 8,940
Argentina 1,175 Mexico 1,669 Hungary 8,915
Ghana 1,149 Argentina 1,456 Israel 8,527
Pakistan 988 India 1,300 DR Congo 8,229








Top 10 as share
of total
65% Top 10 as share
of total
53% Top 10 as share
of total
46%
Source: UNHCR, Population Data Unit, PGDS/DOS, Geneva.
Claims for asylum in Canada from people originating from the Indian sub-continent
have remained consistently high between 1990 and 2001. Whereas in the USA, numbers
of asylum-seekers from Central America have reduced and those from Mexico and
Colombia had increased significantly during the same period. Asylum-seekers from the
Americas tend to come by land. But most asylum-seekers coming to Canada come much
larger distances and by necessity travel by sea or air. It is difficult with the information
available to make generalizations and identify patterns about many such asylum-
seekers. A factor seems to be Canada’s programme of resettlement of refugees and
asylum-seekers. Many asylum-seekers going to Canada appear to be from the elite
sectors of their societies of origin and they frequently fly there.
4.3 Australia
Australia has a Humanitarian Program, designed to bring in refugees from overseas,
with fairly constant targets of around 12,000 per year since the early 1990s. Until 1999-
2000 the Humanitarian Program had three components: Refugees as defined by the 1951
UN Refugee Convention, to resettle refugees in collaboration with the UNHCR; the
Special Humanitarian Program (SHP) for people who suffer gross human rights
violations but would not qualify under the 1951 Convention; and the Special Assistance
Category (SAC) which was established to allow people displaced by violence in such
countries as Former Yugoslavia to join relatives in Australia. In 2000-2001 the SAC
was phased out. In recent years an additional non-Program category has grown in
importance:  Onshore Protection Visa Grants, for people who claim asylum after
arriving in Australia.10
The Humanitarian Program arrival figures show an apparent decline in recent years,
falling from 13,824 in 1995-1996 to 8,779 in 1997-1998 and 7,625 in 2000-01 (DIMIA
2002). This is due to the increase in Onshore Protection Visas from 1,588 in 1997-1998
to 1,834 in 1998-1999, 2,458 in 1999-2000 and 5,577 in 2000-2001. Some of these
visas were granted to people who arrived by air on a visitor visa and then claimed
asylum, but increasing numbers have gone to boat people. The number of persons
arriving in Australia by boat without permission averaged only a few hundred per year
up to the late 1990s, but went up to 920 in 1998-1999, 4,175 in 1999-2000 and 4,141 in
2000-2001 (Crock and Saul 2002: 24). Although these numbers are low compared with
other parts of the world, the growth is seen as undermining the tradition of strict
government control of entries, which has hitherto been possible because of Australia’s
remote location.
The illegal entrants fell into two main groups: Chinese people smuggled in mainly for
purposes of undocumented work; and asylum-seekers from the Middle East and South
Asia (Iraqis, Iranians, Afghans and others) brought in from Indonesia, usually on fishing
boats chartered by people smugglers. In 1999, the Australian Government introduced a
number of deterrent measures, including a 3-year Temporary Protection Visa (TPV),
which confers no right to permanent settlement or family reunion. Another deterrent is
to stop boat people from landing on Australian shores, and to try to send them back to
Indonesia. Those who do land are detained – sometimes for years – in isolated and
remote camps, where they are isolated from lawyers, the media and supporters. Hunger
strikes, riots, self-inflicted injuries and even suicide have become commonplace. The
government has also introduced legal measures to limit the power of the courts in
asylum matters (Crock and Saul 2002: Chapter 5).
Matters got even worse in August 2001, when the Norwegian freighter MV Tampa
picked up over 400 asylum-seekers (mainly from Afghanistan and Iraq) from a sinking
boat off Northern Australia. The government refused the captain permission to land, and
the Tampa anchored near the Australian territory of Christmas Island. This was the start
of a saga involving international diplomacy, heated public debates in Australia, and
feverish political activity. In the ‘Pacific Solution’, Australia tried to export the asylum-
seekers to its neighbours, Nauru and New Guinea – and was willing to spend vast sums
of money to do so. Asylum became the central issue in the November Election, giving
victory to Liberal-National Prime Minister Howard. Before the Tampa affair, a Labor
victory had been predicted. The 2002-2003 Federal Budget included A$2.8 billion for
border control measures – an increase of A$1.2 billion over the previous year. Even
stricter border control legislation was introduced in 2002 (Castles and Vasta 2003).
Table 4 shows the top ten countries of origin of asylum-seekers in 1996 and 2001, while
Appendix Chart 3 shows the flows for the top 5 countries from 1996-2001.
In the case of Australia, comparable figures are not available for the 1990-1995 period.
Asylum-seekers were more numerous in the early 1990s than later on – probably due to
arrivals from the Former Yugoslavia. Some 12,100 asylum-seekers arrived in 1990 and
16,700 in 1991. The numbers dipped to 6-7,000 annually in the mid-1990s. Despite the
recent asylum panic, the number of asylum-seekers only rose to 13,100 in 2000 and
12,400 in 2001.11
Table 4




seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers
Philippines 1,630 Afghanistan 2,161 Indonesia 7,529
Indonesia 1,420 Iraq 1,784 China 6,649
Sri Lanka 1,096 China 1,176 Iraq 5,378
China 1,007 Indonesia 897 Philippines 4,665
India 339 Fiji 799 Afghanistan 4,241
Turkey 269 India 650 Sri Lanka 4,025
Lebanon 262 Iran 559 India 2,873
Thailand 253 Sri Lanka 397 Fiji 2,134
Fiji 221 Malaysia 261 Iran 1,910
Iran 215 Bangladesh 261 Thailand 1,263








Top 10 as share
of total
69% Top 10 as share
of total
72% Top 10 as share
of total
65%
Source: UNHCR, Population Data Unit, PGDS/DOS, Geneva.
4.4 Western Europe
The data presented for Western Europe refer to asylum-seekers making applications in
the 15 member countries of the EU, as well as Norway and Switzerland, from 1990-
2001.3 Table 5 presents figures on the top ten countries of origin of asylum-seekers for
Western Europe. Again the figures are ranked by size for 1990, 2001 and for the
aggregate of the 12 years. The top ten countries of origin for the period 1990-2001 were
the Federal Republic (FR) of Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, Iran, Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR
Congo). The flows for the top five countries for the period are to be seen in Chart 4 in
the Appendix.
The data shows the dominance of the FR Yugoslavia as a country of origin with almost
936,000 asylum-seekers over the period. The two peaks of asylum-seekers from the FR
Yugoslavia coincide with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia in 1991-1993 and the war in
Kosovo in 1998-1999. The next country of origin is Romania, with a total of over
                                                
3 Some of the material presented in Western Europe in this paper is based on a study carried out by the
authors together with Heaven Crawley for the Institute of Public Policy Research (London) on behalf
of the European Commission. See (Castles et al. 2003).12
Table 5




seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers Country of origin
Asylum-
seekers
Romania 62,194 Iraq 42,834 FR Yugoslavia 935,973
Turkey 48,771 Afghanistan 39,756 Romania 412,326
FR Yugoslavia 33,216 Turkey 29,458 Turkey 392,867
Lebanon 29,881 FR Yugoslavia 27,169 Iraq 272,918
Afghanistan 21,420 Russia 14,380 Afghanistan 192,581
Sri Lanka 19,279 Iran 12,802 Bosnia &
Herzegovina
184,005
Iran 18,451 Somalia 11,320 Sri Lanka 169,666
Viet Nam 13,466 Sri Lanka 10,858 Iran 143,651
Bulgaria 13,020 Bosnia &
Herzegovina
10,623 Somalia 142,148
Somalia 12,296 Algeria 10,056 DR Congo 123,441








Top 10 as share
of total
62% Top 10 as share
of total
52% Top 10 as share
of total
59%
Source: UNHCR, Population Data Unit, PGDS/DOS, Geneva.
400,000 concentrated overwhelmingly in the early part of the 1990s, at a time of marked
persecution of Roma and other ethnic minorities. Next comes Turkey, with over
392,000 asylum-seekers quite evenly distributed across the period. Most appear to be
Kurds, fleeing violent conflicts involving government forces in areas of supposed
support for the Kurdish separatist party, the PKK.
All the countries of origin in the chart show considerable fluctuations, linked to the
development of internal conflicts and civil wars in the countries concerned. Together
the top ten countries of origin accounted for almost 3 million asylum-seekers entering
Western Europe from 1990-2001. This is 59 per cent of the total number of asylum-
seekers in the period. Just over one third of these asylum-seekers came from three
European countries: FR Yugoslavia, Romania and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As an earlier study conducted by the same authors shows (Castles et al. 2003), in some
individual years during the period 1990-2000 other countries of origin also appear in the
top ten: for example China, Vietnam, Algeria and Nigeria. The next ten countries of
origin for this 11-year period were Bulgaria, Pakistan, India, Nigeria, Russia, Vietnam,
Algeria, China, Albania and Lebanon. Together they accounted for about 18 per cent of
all asylum-seekers. Of these just under a quarter were from European countries, if
Russia is not included. If Russia is counted as Europe, the share goes up to one third.13
The top 20 countries together make up 77 per cent of all asylum-seekers entering
Western Europe during this 11-year period.
There is no space for a detailed analysis of the figures for each Western European
country here. In general, the top ten countries of origin for asylum-seekers coming to
Western Europe as a whole also usually appear in the top 15 countries of origin for each
individual country in the region. However, there are significant national variations.
These appear to be linked to a number of factors. The first is geographical position (or
proximity): countries towards the eastern borders of Western Europe are more likely to
receive asylum-seekers from Eastern Europe, such as Russians and Bulgarians in
Finland and Austria. Southern European countries, such as Greece, are more likely to
receive asylum-seekers from South-eastern Europe (Albania, Romania) or the Middle
East (Iraq, Iran). Other factors include pre-existing links, especially through a former
colonial presence, and a common language. Belgium is host to many asylum-seekers
from the DR Congo, its former colony of the Congo; France has many asylum-seekers
from Mali and Mauritania.
5 Routes used by asylum-seekers
Increasingly in recent years, much asylum migration is conducted clandestinely, often
with the assistance of smugglers. By necessity, these routes are often complex, kept as
secret as possible, and are ever-changing. For example, in the case of Chinese travelling
to the USA, the use of air, sea and land-based forms of transport through over 43 transit
countries, makes it difficult to generalize about the routes used in any meaningful way.
In 1990, most people seeking asylum in the USA, and significant numbers in Canada,
were from Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) and Cuba (see
Tables 2 and 3). These are all neighbouring countries from which asylum-seekers could
travel to the USA by land or by a relatively short sea crossing. Many Central Americans
travelled up to the USA via Mexico. Although many Mexican immigrants (documented
and undocumented) went to the USA, relatively few sought asylum until a few years
later. By 2001, comparatively large numbers of Colombians and Mexicans were seeking
asylum in the USA and Canada, also largely travelling by land. However, by this time a
much larger proportion of asylum-seekers to North America were coming from a greater
diversity of countries and from much further affield.
While concrete evidence is often difficult to come by, most people seeking asylum in
Western Europe from other European countries (such as the FR Yugoslavia, Romania,
Bosnia and Herzegovina) and West Asian countries (Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan) arrive by
land, often following long and sometimes indirect transit routes. For those travelling
longer distances, particularly from sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, strong
colonial links and direct flights often to go hand-in-hand. Mode of transportation is
often clearly influenced by economic status. The better off are more likely to fly, and to
go to a country of their own choosing. The poor may be smuggled in boats and trucks,
and the smugglers may strongly influence the choice of destination.
Many asylum-seekers pass through other countries before arriving in Western Europe.
Some of these transit countries, which are often very poor, host large refugee
populations of their own. For some 40 years, Tanzania has received some of the largest14
refugee inflows in Africa from its troubled neighbours, including at various times the
Republic of South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda
and the DR Congo. Today Tanzania – one of world’s poorer nations – still has the
largest refugee population of the continent: at least 500,000. Other important transit
countries include Guinea, Kenya, Indonesia, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Turkey. In
what are already impoverished countries, the refugees live in cramped conditions
without access to legal rights and basic services, placing huge burdens upon their host
states. While EU states have increasingly resisted resettling refugees from these ‘safe
third countries’, they have also provided insufficient support to the states hosting them.
This was recognized in a European Commission report in 2000 (European Parliament
2000).
Most asylum-seekers going to Australia seem to have been doing so by often-perilous
voyages on fishing boats and similar craft across the Timor Sea or the Indian Ocean.
The adoption of very tight monitoring and interdiction policies by the Australian
authorities over the past couple of years seems to have considerably restricted such
flows.
6 Causes of asylum-seeker movements to Western countries
To explain the changes in asylum migration flows for the various receiving areas, it is
important to understand their causes. The following section is based on an analysis of
causal factors for main source areas for the EU from 1990-2000 (Castles et al. 2003).
To get a full picture it would be necessary to examine causes in all significant countries
of origin. However, for reasons of time and resources, our discussion focuses on just the
top ten. It is our view that the diverse profiles of the top ten are reasonably
representative of the sending countries as a whole. We also assume that the factors
relevant for asylum migration to the EU apply reasonably well to the other destination
countries. We distinguish here between ‘push factors’, ‘pull factors’ and ‘intermediate
factors and migration mechanisms’. This distinction is useful for a discussion of the
various factors, but it is important to realize that specific migratory processes are always
shaped by a combination of these factors. The main emphasis in our account is on push
factors.
6.1 Push factors
We identified the following as possible key push factors:
(1) Repression of minorities or ethnic conflict
(2) Civil war
(3) High numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) relative to total population
(4) Poverty as reflected in low per capita income
(5) Low position on the Human Development Index (HDI)
(6) Low life expectancy
(7) High population density
(8) High adult literacy rate
Factors 1, 2 and 3 relate directly to persecution and conflict. We should expect these to
be significant, since flight is generally a survival strategy in the face of threats to life15
and personal safety. Factors 4, 5 and 6 are indicators of underdevelopment, and would
be important if migration were mainly economically motivated. Factor 7 needs to be
considered, as some analysts claim that both economic and forced migration are linked
to high population density. Factor 8 relates to the importance of human capital in giving
people the ability to migrate. It is obviously significant for economic migration, but
should be less so for forced migration.
Factor 1: Repression of minorities or ethnic conflict
There is no single statistical indicator for this type of conflict. We have used reports
produced by the Immigration and Nationality Directorate of the UK’s Home Office, the
US Department of State, and the US Committee for Refugees. These show that issues of
persecution of minorities or ethnic conflicts exist in all the top ten countries of origin.
This is indeed the only common factor in all the cases. In several cases these have taken
the form of all-out internal war. In other cases, there has been persecution of ethnic or
religious minorities by dominant groups, or by leaders using ethnicity as a way of
consolidating their own power.
Most asylum-seekers from Romania belong to the Roma (or gipsy) minority. Intense
persecution of this group after the collapse of the pro-Soviet Ceaucescu regime in 1989
led to a mass exodus, mainly to Germany. The improvement of the human rights
situation in the late 1990s led to reduced emigration. Many asylum-seekers from
Turkey, Iraq and Iran belong to the Kurdish minority, which experiences discrimination
and persecution in all three countries. Violent repression of Shi’a Muslims by the Sunni
Muslim ruling group is also a cause of flight from Iraq. Identifying ethnic conflict as a
key factor does not imply that we see ethnicity itself as an explanation for conflict.
Ethnic conflict is often a surrogate for other problems: political entrepreneurs have used
ethnicity in the post-Cold War period as an effective tool of mobilization, but the
underlying aims are often economic or political (Gallagher 1997; Turton 1997).
Factor 2: Civil war
Major internal wars occurred or continued in the period 1990-2001 in the
FR Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Somalia and the
DR Congo. Some of the conflicts were at least in part hangovers from the proxy wars of
the Cold War period. The conflicts in Eastern and South-eastern European countries
were linked to problems of transition following the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Some of
these conflicts have in the meantime been resolved or reduced in intensity.
In the post-Cold War period, ideological conflict has been replaced by more localized
conflicts connected with identity struggles, ethnic divisions, problems of state formation
and competition for economic assets. Internal wars are simultaneously transnational as
they are linked to international economic and political interests, and draw in a range of
international actors, both military and humanitarian. The means of warfare have also
changed. The protagonists are not large standing armies but irregular forces. The aim is
not control of territory, but political control of the population. Mass population
expulsion is often a strategic goal, which is why the ‘new wars’ have led to such an
upsurge in forced migration (Kaldor 2001). Ninety per cent of those killed are civilians.
Both government forces and insurgents use exemplary violence including torture and
sexual assault as means of control. Genocide and ethnic cleansing are systemic elements16
of the new form of warfare, rather than expressions of ‘age-old hatreds’ (Summerfield
1999).
Factor 3: High numbers of IDPs in the country
A large population of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in a country can provide a
reservoir of people seeking to escape misery at home through finding asylum in
industrialized countries. All the top ten source countries of asylum-seekers going to the
EU, except Romania and Iran, have substantial IDP populations. Clearly there is a link
between IDPs and asylum-seeking, although an IDP population is not a root cause, but
rather a symptom of conflict within a country. IDP populations alone cannot explain
asylum-seeking in the EU, for there are many countries with huge IDP populations,
which do not move to the EU or other industrialized countries (Table 6).
Table 6
IDPs in 2000
Country of origin Total no. of IDPs No. of IDPs per 1000 of population





Bosnia & Herzegovina 518,000 133
Sri Lanka 600,000 32
Iran 0** n.a.
Somalia 300,000 32
DR Congo (Zaire) 1,800,000* 36
Source: US Committee on Refugees (2001), World Refugee Survey 2001, Washington DC:
USCR.
* These figures are rough estimates
** The figure zero here does not mean that there are no IDPs at all in the country concerned,
but rather that they are not present in significant numbers.
Factor 4: Standard of living as shown by low per capita income
Politicians and the media assert that many asylum-seekers are in fact economic
migrants, who misuse the asylum system to circumvent immigration restrictions. If this
were the case, one might expect migrants to come primarily from poor countries with
large unemployed populations. One way of testing this is to look at the GDP per capita
of the main sending countries. The figures in Table 7 are based on ‘purchasing power
parities’ (PPP) – that is they are corrected to indicate relative living standards.
Unfortunately, data is not available for all ten countries.17
Table 7
GDP per capita 1992 and 1999
GDP per capita (PPP in US Dollars)
Country of origin 1992 1999





Bosnia & Herzegovina - -
Sri Lanka 2,850 3,279
Iran 5,420 5,531
Somalia 1,001 -
DR Congo (Zaire) 523 801
Sources: UNDP (1995; 2001).
These figures appear to offer no support for a simple connection between low income
and propensity to seek asylum in the EU. Asylum-seekers come from both middle-
income countries like Turkey and Iran, and from low-income countries like
Afghanistan, Somalia and the DR Congo. However, the figures should not be read as
indicating the absence of a link between the economic situation and forced migration.
Rather the link appears to be more complex. For instance, relative deprivation might be
more relevant than absolute income levels: where income has declined or inequality
increased due to economic problems this might lead to out-migration, even if absolute
income is at relatively high levels. The figures for Romania show a strong growth in
income from 1992 to 1999, which coincided with a decline in out-migration. This
indicates that economic improvement may be linked to reduced forced migration.
Factor 5: Low position on Human Development Index
A more sophisticated measurement of development and social well-being is provided by
the UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI), which
assigns countries a HDI-value on the basis of a range of indicators including: longevity,
as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational attainment; and standard of living.
We have used figures for 1995, when 174 states were included in the HDI, and for
1999, when 162 states were included (UNDP 1995; 2001) (Table 8).
Again, the Table shows no simple link between HDI scores and forced migration to the
EU. None of the sending countries are high on the HDI, but several are at an
intermediate level, notably Romania, Turkey, Iran and Sri Lanka. Somalia, Afghanistan
and DR Congo are very low on the HDI. But there are many countries with low HDI
scores which are not significant source countries for asylum-seekers. Underdevelopment
in itself does not appear to be a major push factor for forced migration. Again, we
would speculate that there are links, but that they are more complex in nature. It is well
established in migration theory that most economic migrants do not belong to the very18
Table 8
Human Development Index (HDI) values and rankings for 1995 and 1999
HDI value HDI ranking
Country of origin 1995 1999 1995 1999
FR Yugoslavia - - - -
Romania 0.703 0.772 98 58
Turkey 0.792 0.735 66 82
Iraq 0.617 - 106 -
Afghanistan 0.228 - 170 -
Bosnia & Herzegovina - - - -
Sri Lanka 0.704 0.735 97 81
Iran 0.770 0.714 70 90
Somalia 0.246 - 166 -
DR Congo (Zaire) 0.384 0.429 143 142
Sources: UNDP (1995; 2001).
poorest strata in the lowest-income countries. Rather migrants tend to come from
intermediate groups, who have the economic and cultural capital needed for mobility
(Chiswick 2000; Martin and Taylor 2001; Massey et al. 1998). By contrast, refugees
and IDPs often include the very poorest people from very poor countries. Such people
are likely to remain in the region of displacement, as they lack the resources to move
further. This explains why relatively few refugees from some of the world’s largest
displaced populations – such as Burundi, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Angola – have come
to the EU (Schmeidl 2001).
It is helpful to separate between why people leave their countries, and why they come to
industrialized countries. Refugees and asylum-seekers flee their countries of origin
because of persecution or threats to their very existence. They often seek immediate
protection in neighbouring countries. However, many countries of first asylum cannot
offer effective protection or assistance, due to their own political and economic
difficulties. The displaced people may therefore continue their flight. In this process, a
certain selection takes place: those with the greatest financial resources and human
capital are more likely to move onwards, and a small proportion of these will seek
protection in the developed world.
Factor 6: Low life expectancy
We now turn to demographic and social indicators thought by some to show possible
causes of forced migration. Table 9 presents data for the next three indicators.
Low life expectancy can be taken as indicative of poor health conditions, poor nutrition
and similar social ills. However, the figures presented in Table 7 show no clear pattern.
Life expectancy ranges from very low in Afghanistan, Somalia and DR Congo to quite
high in the FR Yugoslavia, Romania, Turkey, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka and Iran.
High mortality and low life expectancy could obviously be a result of protracted
conflict, as is probably the case in the countries mentioned, but it is interesting to see
how relatively high life expectancy has been maintained in certain conflict areas.19
Table 9
Population density, illiteracy and life expectancy at birth




(1999) 1992 1999 1992 1999
FR Yugoslavia 104 - - - 72
Romania 97 3 2 70 70
Turkey 84 19 16 67 70
Iraq 52 45 46 66 59
Afghanistan 40 71 65 44 46
Bosnia & Herzegovina 76 - - - 73
Sri Lanka 294 11 9 72 73
Iran 39 35 26 68 71
Somalia 15 73 - 47 48
DR Congo (Zaire) 22 26 41 52 51
Sources: World Bank (2001); UNDP (1995).
Definitions: Population density represents the total number of inhabitants per square kilometre
of the surface area. Life expectancy at birth represents the number of years a newborn infant
would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of birth were to stay the same throughout
the child’s life. Adult illiteracy represents the percentage of people aged 15 and above who
cannot, with understanding, both read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life.
Factor 7: High population density
The figures on population density show considerable variation, ranging from high
density in Sri Lanka, through intermediate levels in most of the countries, to low density
in DR Congo and Somalia. Population density in itself seems to have no explanatory
value. However, it might be argued that it is not population density itself, but rather
population growth that is important. Some analysts claim that rapid population growth
is leading to resource competition, economic decline and conflict in many less
developed countries (Zolberg 2001). To test this relationship, Kritz carried out a
quantitative analysis of demographic indicators in countries of origin of migrants to the
USA. She found: ‘no support for the claim that population growth drives US
immigration. Indeed migrants are more likely to come from countries with low to
moderate population growth rates rather than ... from countries with the highest growth
rates’ (Kritz 2001: 36). She also found no link between total fertility rates or population
density and migration. This analysis concerns all migrants, but is likely to be valid for
forced migrants too.
Factor 8: Adult illiteracy rate
A high degree of literacy might be seen as conducive to economic migration as it helps
potential migrants obtain the ‘cultural capital’ (that is the knowledge of opportunities
and mechanisms of migration) needed for mobility. It should not in principle be relevant
for asylum-seekers who move out of sheer necessity. The figures presented on adult
illiteracy in Table 9 show considerable fluctuations, from very low in Sri Lanka and20
Romania, to very high in Iraq, Afghanistan and Somalia. However, most of the
countries have reasonably high rates of literacy – defined here as illiteracy rates of less
than 25 per cent of the population.
Relative importance of the push factors
Table 10 summarizes which push factors are present or absent in each country of origin.
A number of assumptions have been made for indicators for which we have no hard
data (such as GDP in the FR Yugoslavia). HDI scores are not included in this Table, as
they are a composite of other factors.
It is quite obvious that indicators of conflict are far more significant than indicators of
development. Repression of minorities and ethnic conflicts are the only factor present in
all the top ten sending countries. Civil wars are present in seven cases. A high number
of IDPs is also to be found in seven cases. Low income is to be found in only half the
countries, while high population density exists in only one – Sri Lanka. Low life
expectancy is only to be found in three of the top ten countries of origin. The only social
indicator of any real significance seems to be the relatively high literacy levels (over 75
per cent of the population) found in six cases, with Iran on the borderline.
A factor not addressed in this study, is the importance of gender-related violence and
persecution for forced migration. Gender-based violence plays a major part in many
ethnic conflicts and internal wars. Systematic rape of women on the basis of ethnic
group belonging or minority status took place in Bosnia, Rwanda and many other places
in the 1990s. Domestic violence and female genital mutilation are on-going phenomena
in many societies – often closely linked to underdevelopment, absence of the rule of law
and deprivation of human rights. Gender-based persecution has been recognized in
refugee jurisprudence as a grounds for granting asylum, usually on the basis of the 1951
Convention category of membership of a specific social group. There is a need for
detailed research on the links between gender-based persecution and the other factors
dealt with here.
Table 10
Push factors in top ten countries of origin of asylum-seekers coming to EU countries, 1990-2000




XXX X XXX X XX
2. Civil war X 0 0 X X X X 0 X X
3. High no. of IDPs X 0 0 X X X X 0 X X
4. Low per capita
income
000 X X0X 0 XX
6. Low life
expectancy
000 0 X00 0 XX
7. High population
density
000 0 00X 0 00
8. High literacy
rates
XXX X 0XX 0 / X 00
Sources: Data from Tables 6-9.
X = significant factor;   0 = not a significant factor.21
6.2 Pull factors
In the context of this paper, ‘pull factors’ refers to factors which influence forced
migrants to seek asylum in a given country or region. Despite the fact they are fleeing
violence or persecution, some asylum-seekers may have a degree of control over where
they go and how they travel. In general, people seek asylum in industrialized countries
mainly because they hope to obtain protection and security for themselves and their
families. The high level of peace and public order, democratic institutions and the rule
of law constitute attractions for people who have been persecuted by their own
governments or by insurgent forces. Economic factors play a part too, even for refugees.
Strong economies and developed welfare and health systems offer the chance of
reasonable living standards for people originating in countries with high degrees of
inequality, corrupt administrations and war-devastated economies.
These are constant factors, which make industrialized countries attractive. However,
most asylum-seekers come from a fairly small number of countries. Other countries,
which generate large numbers of IDPs and refugees, are not the source of major flows to
Western Europe, North America and Australia. Clearly there are selective factors at
work. Geographical proximity is clearly very important: asylum-seekers from Eastern
and South Eastern Europe tend to go to Austria and Germany, while North Africans are
more likely to go to France, Italy or Spain. Central Americans mainly go to the USA.
By contrast, Canada and Australia seem to attract asylum-seekers from a wide range of
origins.
Past colonial links, common language and diaspora communities are very important.
For instance, asylum-seekers from the DR Congo tend to go to Belgium, while
Nigerians appear to favour the UK. The lack of proximity in these cases is often
compensated for by direct airline connections. Another factor is past labour recruitment:
for instance the high proportion of Turks and people from former Yugoslavia coming to
Germany is linked to the ‘guestworker’ recruitment of the 1960s and 1970s. Thus the
presence of an existing ethnic community can be an important pull factor for others
from the same country of origin. It is important to realize that asylum-seeking is part of
the dynamic social process of migration: once a migratory flow is established it tends to
continue even if policies change. This does not imply that the quest for asylum is not
genuine, but rather that it is part of a broader process of social transformation.
6.3 Intermediate factors and migration mechanisms
The distinction between push and pull factors is useful for descriptive purposes, but is
too schematic to be maintained in an analysis of any specific migratory movement. The
decision to migrate – even for purposes of seeking asylum – is the result of
consideration of a wide range of factors by the potential migrants, their families and
their communities (Bissell and Natsios 2001). Typically, refugees are forced to flee by
violence and persecution and have no time to plan their departure. However, as they
move on from the initial place of refuge, people consider conditions and opportunities in
both sending and receiving areas, as well as the costs and risks of the travel. This is why
intermediate factors are important in deciding where forced migrants go. The presence
of a pre-existing ethnic community in a potential destination was discussed above as a
pull factor, but it can also be seen as the basis for a transnational migrant network – and
thus as an intermediate or facilitating factor. Communication with previous migrants22
can be seen as a type of social capital, since it can provide the means of obtaining
advice and support to enable a person to move, and of finding shelter, work and
protection on arrival.
Such networks take on a more formal shape in the so-called ‘migration industry’. This
term embraces the many people who earn their livelihood by organizing migratory
movements as travel agents, bankers, labour recruiters, brokers, interpreters, and
housing agents. Such people range from lawyers who give advice on immigration law,
through to human smugglers who transport migrants illegally across borders. Some
migration agents are themselves members of a migrant community, helping their
compatriots on a voluntary or part-time basis: shopkeepers, priests, teachers and other
community leaders often take on such roles. Others are unscrupulous criminals, out to
exploit defenceless migrants or asylum-seekers by charging them extortionate fees for
non-existent jobs. Yet others are police officers or bureaucrats, making money on the
side by showing people loopholes in regulations. In many cases, it is the people-
smugglers who decide where people will go – the migrants themselves may have little
choice, and may not even know where they are going. Government attempts to crack
down on illegal operators, are not likely to have much success as long as there are
powerful reasons to move. Facilitating migration has become a major international
business partly as a result of attempts at border control and regional restriction. By
making it harder for people to move legally to meet an existing labour demand,
opportunities for alternative modes of migration have been expanded (Castles and
Miller 2003: Chapter 5).
7 Conclusions
There is nothing new about the blurring of distinctions between economic migration and
refugee movements, but this asylum-migration nexus has gained added significance in
the current climate of concern about the possibility of controlling cross-border flows in
an epoch of globalization. Our description of asylum migration to the main
industrialized receiving countries shows a high degree of fluctuation in numbers and
source countries, as well as trends towards increasing diversity in areas of origin.
However, there are also some constants, such as the importance of proximity, prior
linkages (such as colonial presence or cultural affinities) and diasporas (or migration
networks). Many of the principles of migration theory, though based on the experience
of economic migration, are also relevant for analysing asylum migration.
In comparing migration asylum flows to Western Europe the USA, Canada and
Australia for the period 1990-2001, we found that Western Europe is the destination of
most asylum-seekers going to industrialized countries. The next most significant
destination is the USA, followed by Canada and finally Australia. To a greater or lesser
extent, asylum migration to Western Europe, the USA and Canada have all followed a
similar pattern in annual volumes of flows during the period. This pattern involved an
upsurge in total numbers in the early 1990s, followed by a levelling off and a reduction
around the mid-1990s. Beginning in 1996 in Western Europe, and 1998/1999 in the
USA and Canada, these numbers were rising again at the decade’s end.
A comparison of the numbers of asylum-seekers coming to individual industrialized
countries relative to the populations of these receiving countries is informative. For23
example, while the USA receives more asylum-seekers in absolute numbers than any
other country included in this study, it receives a relatively low number in proportion to
its overall population.
For most countries of asylum in this study the numbers of asylum-seekers from the top
ten countries of origin as a proportion of the total numbers coming to these countries
had reduced significantly in 2001 compared with 1990 (from 1996 to 2001 in the case
of Australia). This indicates that there was an increasing diversity in countries of origin
of asylum-seekers during this period.
Finally, as the countries of origin in the Tables indicate, asylum migrants generally
came from further afield in 2001 compared with 1990. Although asylum migration from
neighbouring countries, often travelling by land, remained significant for many
receiving countries, it was less so in 2001 compared with 1990. There has been a trend
to ever more sophisticated and expensive ways and means of travelling from countries
of origin to countries of asylum. Increasingly people have been travelling by air, using
false visas and passports and using intermediaries, including people smugglers. There
appears to be much more diversity and complexity in routes used, involving the use of
more people to guide, transport and shelter migrants.
The policies of receiving countries, though not analysed in detail here, are important in
shaping asylum migration. Attempts to control migration or to stop certain flows may
have unforeseen results in changing the direction and characteristics of mobility.
Migration rules should be seen not as rigid barriers, but as elements in opportunity
structures which help influence how, and where, people move.
The analysis of the causes of forced migration to the EU shows the complex relationship
between push, pull and intermediate factors. The main focus was on causes in the
countries of origin. We found that indicators of conflict (repression of minorities or
ethnic conflict, internal wars and IDP populations) were the best predictors of outflows
of forced migrants. However, to explain why most migrants remained within the region
while others went to specific EU countries, it was necessary to look at pull and
intermediate factors as well. In fact, the separation into these types of causal factors,
although useful for analysis, cannot be sustained in practice, for every migratory
movement is the result of a dynamic interaction between a multitude of factors.
Economic and political causes form not a pair of opposites but a continuum. Similarly,
the distinction between conflict and development indicators needs to be questioned,
because conflicts are often the expression of failure to bring about economic and social
development, to introduce democratic institutions and to safeguard human rights.
Multiple causes for migratory movements and multiple motivations on the part of
migrants are very frequent.24
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